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I. INTRODUCTION 
Climate Change has found its way into the World Trade Organization through the 
backdoor of the profitable and contentious trade in solar and wind energy 
technologies. In addition to the Ontario FIT dispute critically examined in this 
article, there are at least five other active disputes in Geneva over aspects of trade 
in wind and solar technologies, with more on the horizon.1  
 
Solar panels constitute a significant part of China’s total export sales in the EU2 
and for more than two years its trade has overheated EU-China relations. The anti-
                                                     
1 Panel Report, Canada – Certain Measures Affecting the Renewable Energy Generation Sector and 
Canada – Measures Relating to the Feed-In Tariff Program, WT/DS412/R, WT/DS426/R (Dec. 
19, 2012) [hereinafter Canada – Renewable Energy]; European Union and Certain Member States 
— Certain Measures Affecting the Renewable Energy Generation Sector, DS452 (Complainant: 
China), Nov. 5, 2012 [hereinafter EU – Renewable Energy]; India — Certain Measures Relating to 
Solar Cells and Solar Modules, DS456 (Complainant: United States), Feb. 6, 2013 [hereinafter 
India – Solar Cells]; United States — Countervailing Duty Measures on Certain Products from China, 
DS437 (Complainant: China), May 25, 2012; China — Measures concerning wind power 
equipment, DS419 (Complainant: United States) Dec. 22, 2010; United States — Countervailing 
Duty Measures on Certain Products from China DS437 (Complainant: China), May 25, 2012. 
2 About 60% of China’s exports of solar panels and components – with a value of €21 
billion out of the total export value of 292 billion in goods – were imported from China to 
the EU in 2011. See EU launches solar panel probe into Chinese ‘dumping’ claims, EURACTIV.COM 
(Sept. 6, 2012), http://www.euractiv.com/energy/eu-launches-solar-panel-probe-
ch-news-514652. Chinese companies grabbed about 80 percent of the European solar 
panel market in 2012. See Europe’s Biggest Solar Projects Threatened by China Deal, BLOOMBERG 
(Jul. 30, 2013), http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2013-07-29/china-eu-solar-
panel-deal-seen-hurting-large-scale-projec.html. 
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dumping and anti-subsidy investigations3 that resulted have now culminated in a 
tentative settlement to bring Chinese solar panel prices to a “sustainable” level.4 
Winds have been blowing more strongly on the other side of the Atlantic, though 
in a similar direction, where the US imposed record high rates of anti-dumping and 
countervailing duties on Chinese (and Vietnamese) wind towers, as well as silicon 
solar panels.5 The political economy unfolding in both cases has been quite similar: 
on one side - claiming unfair trade allegedly committed by the Chinese exporters6 - 
are the import-competing manufacturers of Renewable Energy (`RE’) technology, 
and on the other side, the rest of the RE industry, particularly generators in whose 
interest it is to have access to the best and cheapest equipment, regardless of 
origin.7  
 
                                                     
3  For EC anti-dumping investigations see Press Release, European Commission, EU 
Initiates Anti-Dumping Investigation on Solar Panel Imports from China, (Sept. 6, 2012), 
http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_MEMO-12-647_en.htm. For anti-subsidy 
investigations see Press Release, European Commission, EU Initiates Anti-Subsidy 
Investigation on Solar Panel Imports from China (Nov. 8, 2012), 
http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_MEMO-12-844_en.htm. 
4 James Kanter & Keith Bradsher, Europe and China Agree to Settle Solar Panel Fight, N.Y. 
TIMES, July 27, 2013, 
http://www.nytimes.com/2013/07/28/business/global/european-union-and-
china-settle-solar-panel-fight.html [hereinafter Kanter & Bradsher]. For information on 
the final agreement see http://ec.europa.eu/trade/policy/countries-and-
regions/countries/china/. 
5 See Utility Scale Wind Towers from China and Vietnam (Inv. Nos. 701-TA-486, 731-TA-
1195-1196 (Final), USITC Pub. 4372, Feb. 2013), available at 
http://www.usitc.gov/publications/701_731/pub4372.pdf. See Crystalline Silicon 
Photovoltaic Cells and Modules from China (Inv. Nos. 701-TA-481, 731-TA-1190 (Final), 
USITC Pub. 4360, Nov. 2012), available at 
http://www.usitc.gov/publications/701_731/pub4360.pdf; see also Diane Cardwell, 
Solar Tariffs Upheld, but May Not Help in U.S., N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 7, 2012; Keith Bradsher & 
Diane Cardwell, U.S. Slaps High Tariffs on Chinese Solar Panels, N.Y. TIMES, May 18, 2012; 
Obama’s Tariffs on China’s Solar Products Will Cost U.S., BLOOMBERG BUS. WEEK, May 15, 
2012. 
6 In the case of solar panels, cases have been lodged against Chinese solar companies under 
the leadership of the same German company Solar World. On the US, the main petition 
was filed by the US subsidiary of the German Solar World. See Keith Bradsher, Trade War in 
Solar Takes Place, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 10, 2011, at B1. On the EU side of the issue see Anneli 
Palmeen & Christoph Steitz, Solar World Files Anti-Dumping Complaint in EU, REUTERS, July 
25, 2012.  
7  See ICTSD, EU-China Solar Row Escalates, Amid Rumours of Potential Negotiations, 17(18) 
BRIDGES WEEKLY (May 23, 2013), available at 
http://ictsd.org/i/news/bridgesweekly/164597/.  
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The RE “trade wars” have not been a North-South one-way street. Although 
Chinese “state-capitalism” seems to be an easy target (especially when it comes to 
the language of “subsidies”), the rhetoric of “unfair trade” and the threat of anti-
subsidy and antidumping tariffs has been turned against the EU member states 
(specifically local content measures in Greece and Italy), as well as an array of US 
Federal and State programmes.8 RE trade conflicts have also not remained limited 
to the Sino-EU-US trade nexus, as a pattern of disputes has also emerged between 
US and India.9  
 
The ongoing legal discourse in all these disputes contains the familiar tag of “unfair 
trade” on the one hand and “discrimination” on the other. Unfair trade (illegal 
subsidization and dumping) warrants a legitimate use of trade protection measures 
through the imposition of either antidumping duties, based on allegations of 
import prices being less than “normal value”,10 or anti-subsidy or countervailing 
duties where domestic RE industry suffers from “adverse effects”11 caused by the 
import of allegedly “subsidized”12 RE.  
 
On the other hand are the allegations of an illegitimate use of trade protection measures 
with the rise of green industrial policy measures. These measures include not only 
import-displacing domestic subsidies but also more visibly local content 
requirements, or “buy-local” laws. The latter cases have so far given rise to three 
disputes based on alleged violation of the GATT non-discrimination provisions, 
one of which already settled.13  
  
                                                     
8 See Press Release, Ministry of Commerce of the People’s Republic of China, (Statement of 
the Official of the Import and Export Fair Trade Bureau of the Ministry of Commerce on 
the Preliminary Ruling of the U.S. AD/CVD Case against Chinese Solar Cells), Dec. 3, 
2011, available at 
http://www.mofcom.gov.cn/aarticle/ae/ai/201112/20111207860296.html?18212
06914=50175321.  
9 For the request for the establishment of a panel see Request for the Establishment of a 
Panel by the United States, India – Certain Measures relating to Solar Cells and Solar Modules, 
WT/ DS456/ 5 (Apr. 15, 2014).  
10 Agreement on the Implementation of Article 6 of the General Agreement on Tariffs and 
Trade 1994 (Anti-Dumping Agreement), 1868 U.N.T.S. 279, art. 2.1.  
11  Agreement on Subsidies and Countervailing Measures art. 5, Marrakesh Agreement 
Establishing the World Trade Organization, Apr. 15, 1994, Annex 1A, in WTO 
SECRETARIAT, THE RESULTS OF THE URUGUAY ROUND OF MULTILATERAL TRADE 
NEGOTIATIONS, THE LEGAL TEXTS 231 (1999). 
12 Id., art. 1 (on the definition of the term “subsidy”) and art. 2 (“specificity”).  
13 Canada – Renewable Energy, supra note 1; EU - Renewable Energy, supra note 1; India —Solar 
Cells, supra note 1.  
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The use of trade protection measures (antidumping and countervailing duties) have 
long been disputed by economists, especially in the excessive way they are normally 
implemented.14 However these measures are legitimized and legally endorsed in 
principle while procedurally regulated in the WTO. On the other hand, the case for 
green industrial policy is delegitimized and flatly rejected by the trade community 
as being outright “protectionist”, and not even worthy of carving out exceptions 
based on environmental protection.15 
 
This double standard and especially the mainstream views about the perceived 
illegitimacy of green industrialization per se are put to question in this article. The 
article argues that at the heart of the emerging trade-environment disputes on 
green industrial policy lie novel questions about the scope and legitimacy of the 
role of the state in the economy in general, and in environmental policy in 
particular. Thus, depending on how it unfolds in the WTO dispute settlement 
process; this debate will also have broader implications for trade and development 
inter-linkages.  
 
Today, most of the dominant trade legal discourses do not draw a line between 
“protectionism” and “industrial policy”. Many, if not most, trade lawyers consider 
protectionism to include any domestic regulation intended to promote national 
industry at the expense of foreign competition, regardless of its potential merits.16 
This should not be surprising given that the WTO was born in the mid-1980s 
during the post-Import Substitution Industrialization (‘ISI’) era. The neo-liberal 
spirit of that era was increasingly questioning the regulatory role of the state in 
managing the economy.  
 
This is not to argue that neoliberal policy prescriptions were “encoded” into the 
WTO formal legal obligations. 17  One can, however, clearly observe a regular 
                                                     
14 Cf. BERNARD HOEKMAN & MICHEL KOSTECKI, THE POLITICAL ECONOMIC OF THE 
WORLD TRADING SYSTEM, THE WTO AND BEYOND 322 (2nd ed., 2001). (“Research by 
economists has demonstrated that over 90 percent of all antidumping investigations would 
never have been launched if a competition standard – potential threat of injury to 
competition, as opposed to injury to competitors – had been used as a criterion.”) 
15 Cf. Aaron Cosbey & Petros C. Mavroidis, A Turquoise Mess: Green Subsidies, Blue Industrial 
Policy and Renewable Energy: the Case for Redrafting the Subsidies Agreement of the WTO (Robert 
Schuman Centre for Advanced Studies Global Governance Programme, EUI Working 
Paper RSCAS 2014/17) [hereinafter Cosbey & Mavroidis].  
16 For a recent example see DAVID HUNTER ET AL., INTERNATIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL 
LAW AND POLICY 1206, 1219-1220 (4th ed. 2011) which states that: “Certain violations, 
such as subsidies with local-content requirements, should be illegal per se because they 
always fundamentally violate the core principles and open the door to protectionism.” 
17 See ANDREW LANG, WORLD TRADE LAW AFTER NEOLIBERALISM, REIMAGINING THE 
GLOBAL ECONOMIC ORDER 7 (2011).  
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resurfacing of a particular discourse of state-market relations (especially regarding 
the potential role of the state in economic development) largely dominating and 
forming the habitus18 of the trade legal community. Discursive elements such as 1) 
drawing sharp distinctions between state and the market, 2) a typical reliance on 
the notion of “distortion” and “competition” as neoclassical microeconomic 
analytic, and 3) a bias against the so-called “developmental state”19 (as a by-product 
of state scepticism of the rent seeking school within public choice theory)20, all of 
which seem to have been “institutionalized” as the WTO system’s existing 
“rationality”.21  
 
At the same time, things have been developing in different directions in other 
circles of knowledge creation and policy discourse production, leading to what is 
described as the accelerated rise of “autonomous societal fragments” 22  in 
transnational law.  
 
In development policy circles, especially in the last two decades or so, there has 
been a revival of some form of industrial policy as a legitimate discourse in 
economic development expertise.23 The revival has occurred in light of the failure 
of the so-called Washington Consensus and the success of pro-active state policies 
in the emerging East Asian economies. This new trend in the mainstream 
                                                     
18  According to Bourdieu, habitus is composed of “[s]ystems of durable, transposable 
dispositions, structured structures predisposed to function as structuring structures, that is, 
as principles which generate and organize practices and representations that can be 
objectively adapted to their outcomes without presupposing a conscious aiming at ends or 
an express mastery of the operations necessary in order to attain them.” See PIERRE 
BOURDIEU, THE LOGIC OF PRACTICE (1990). 
19 P EVANS, EMBEDDED AUTONOMY: STATES AND INDUSTRIAL TRANSFORMATION (1995) 
[hereinafter P EVANS].  
20  For the theoretical influence of Austrian economics especially Hayek on neoliberal 
thinking see C Thomas, Law and Neoclassical Economic Development In Theory and Practice: 
Toward an institutionalist critique of institutionalism, 96 CORNELL L. REV. 967, 974 (2010) 
[hereinafter Thomas]. (“Hayek's influence over the rise of neoclassicism stemmed not from 
his economic theory but from his political and legal theory expounding a conception of 
liberty necessitating a minimal government defined by the rule of law.”) 
21 On the notion of “institutionalized rationality” see J. Meyer & B. Rowan, Institutionalized 
organizations: Formal structure as myth and ceremony, 83(2) AM. J. SOC. 340 (1977); P. J. 
DiMaggio & W. W. Powell, The iron cage revisited: Institutional isomorphism and collective rationality 
in organizational fields, 48(2) AM. SOC. REV. 147 (1983). On discourse collision see JEAN-
FRANCOIS LYOTARD, THE DIFFERENT PHASES IN DISPUTE (1987). 
22 Gunther Teubner & Andreas Fischer-Lescano, Regime-Collisions: The Vain Search for Legal 
Unity in the Fragmentation of Global Law, 25(4) MICH. J. INT’L L. 999, 1006 (2004) [hereinafter 
Teubner & Fischer-Lescano].  
23  Dani Rodrik, The Return of Industrial Policy, PROJECT SYNDICATE (Apr. 12, 2010), 
http://www.project- syndicate.org/commentary/the-return-of-industrial-policy.  
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development policy does not usually go as far as the old generation of ISI policies. 
However, the underlying theory behind this trend is akin to “infant industry” 
arguments – arguments widely regarded as having been “discredited” by the 
1980s.24  
 
The emerging trend envisages a much closer public-private interaction than public 
choice theorists would normally endorse. The interaction is one in which states 
would in certain cases support “activities” (rather than actors), and would 
cautiously create “rents” in the domestic economy under certain institutional 
constraints seeking to address certain information and coordination externalities.25 
In this vein, WTO scholarship is increasingly paying attention to and critiquing26 
Rodrik’s notion of the “policy space” to be carved out for developing countries.27 
 
Energy and Environmental circles of expertise are also developing fragments of 
knowledge that are not consistent with the neoclassical microeconomic analytics. 
Studies are emerging on the circumstances under which industrial or localization 
policies might prove an effective way to promote environmental goals.28 That is 
paradigmatically different from purely “market-oriented” approaches to 
environmental policy in which the role of the state is limited at best to internalizing 
polluting activity (through pollution tax or emissions trading), and at worst by non-
discriminatory subsidization of positive externalities such as the promotion of the 
consumption, rather than local production of clean energy. While such win-win 
approaches to the trade-environment relations hold a general bias against the use 
of subsidies for the production of clean energy, or any other localization policies 
(import-substituting subsidies, local content requirements, etc.), the emerging 
literature on energy/environmental policy has kept its toolbox open to empirical 
and institutional analysis with a view to what could work best under which 
circumstances.  
 
                                                     
24 Infra Part III.  
25 Most notably Harvard economist Dani Rodrik has renewed discussions on the possibility 
of designing sensible “industrial policies”. See DANI RODRIK, ONE ECONOMICS, TOO 
MANY RECIPES, GLOBALIZATION, INSTITUTIONS AND ECONOMIC GROWTH (2007) 
[hereinafter DANI RODRIK]. According to Rodrik (at 119), “[a]nytime, a government 
consciously favors some economic activity over others, it is conducting industrial policy.” 
26 FC Oliver Cattaneo, Has the WTO Gone Too Far or Not Far Enough? Some Reflections on the 
Concept of ‘Policy Space’, in CHALLENGES AND PROSPECTS FOR THE WTO 55 (Mitchel ed., 
2005).  
27 Bernard Hoekman, Operationalizing the Concept of Policy Space in the WTO: Beyond Special and 
Differential Treatment, 8(2) J. INT’L ECON. L. 405 (2005) [hereinafter Hoekman]. 
28  IPCC, IPCC SPECIAL REPORT ON RENEWABLE ENERGY SOURCES AND CLIMATE 
CHANGE MITIGATION 901-3 (O. Edenhofer et al., eds., 2012) [hereinafter IPCC Report]. 
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This article uses a dispute that the EU and Japan brought against Canada (Canada 
– Renewable Energy and Canada – FIT)29 as it is the first case settled by the WTO 
Dispute Settlement Body in a streak of cases on trade and renewable energy. An 
analysis is provided to demonstrate the potential opportunities in the legal texts to 
open up a critical space for alternative and progressive modes of interpretations that 
could accommodate certain green industrial policies. The main thesis of this article 
is that the WTO need not be captured by one mode of expertise in its approach to 
the relation between trade and the environment. It should resist reducing the 
totality of the relationship to a win-win narrative as there may be certain areas of 
conflict where trade interests need to give in to environmental interests.  
 
Part II will start with a description of Canada – Renewable Energy to demonstrate 
how the WTO panel and the Appellate Body (AB) deployed formal legal 
interpretation that amounted to avoiding directly addressing the policy issues at 
stake. While such “avoidance technique”, might obscure the “political” in the WTO 
judicial activity, it would nonetheless distribute stakes among various interests in a 
way similar to policy makers. Part III will highlight the rigidity of the idea of trade 
protectionism when compared to other circles of policy expertise where things 
have become much more complex in. After considering competing rationalities 
advanced in the areas of development, energy and environment, the article will re-
examine the outright rejection of the so-called political feasibility rationale for 
green industrial policies. Part IV then concludes the article with a few notes on 
moving beyond the win-win narrative in WTO debates about trade and 
environment.  
 
II. ONTARIO FIT: THE POLITICS OF STRATEGIC FORMALISM  
A. Feed-in Tariffs as an Emerging Global “Model” for RE Promotion 
As of early 2013, RE deployment policies existed in 127 countries, more than two-
thirds of which were developing countries or emerging economies.30 In the budget 
constraining post-financial crisis world, and in some cases due to perceived 
                                                     
29 Canada – Renewable Energy, supra note 1; Appellate Body Report, Canada – Certain Measures 
Affecting the Renewable Energy Generation Sector and Canada – Measures Relating to the Feed-In Tariff 
Program, Reports of the Panels, WT/DS412/AB/R WT/DS426/AB/R, May 6, 2013 
[hereinafter Canada – Renewable Energy AB].  
30  RENEWABLE ENERGY POLICY NETWORK FOR THE 21ST CENTURY (REN21), 
RENEWABLES 2013 GLOBAL STATUS REPORT, 14. (“[t]he BRICS nations accounted for 
36% of total global renewable power capacity and almost 27% of non-hydro renew- able 
capacity. The EU had the most non-hydro capacity at the end of 2012, with approximately 
44% of the global total.”) [hereinafter Renewables 2010 Global Status Report]. 
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maturity of RE markets, many countries undertook extensive revisions of existing 
laws while others maintained or even adopted ambitious new RE targets.31 
 
 
TOTAL CAPACITY AS OF END-201232 
 
While the US remains the largest wind market (thanks to a number of federal and 
state initiatives, including RE portfolio standards 33 ), China, with its complex 
regulatory web of feed-in tariff ( `FIT’), fiscal and financial incentives and 
competitive bidding, has outperformed others in terms of total installed capacity.34 
China is also by far the leading global market for solar hot water systems.35 
 
Currently more than 61 countries and 26 regional jurisdictions have enacted FIT 
laws, which offer a fixed price for a guaranteed duration to RE generators. This 
creates certainty for investors, thereby reducing project development risks and 
often reducing financing costs. 36  These instruments are the favourite RE 
                                                     
31 Id. at 14-5.  
32 Id. at 17. 
33  The United States also “added more capacity from wind power than any other 
technology, and all renewables made up about half of total electric capacity additions 
during the year.” See id. at 14. 
34  In China, FIT model has been used for wind and biomass power plants, bidding 
procedures for offshore wind power plants and wind turbine purchases and increasingly for 
and increasingly for solar power plants. While PV systems have benefited from grants, a 
number of RE programmes gave been funded by a combination of national power 
surcharge and Kyoto Protocol’s Clean Development Mechanism (CDM). See J Lewis, The 
evolving role of carbon finance in promoting renewable energy development in China 38(6) ENERGY 
POL’Y 2875 (2010).  
35 See Renewables 2010 Global Status Report, id note 28. 
36 See James Prest, The Future of Feed-in Tariffs: Capacity Caps, Scheme Closures and Looming Grid 
Parity, 1 RENEWABLE ENERGY L. & POL’Y (2012); Kanter & Bradsher, supra note 5.  
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deployment policy not only among environmental NGOs37 but also prominent 
scientists.38 Despite their popularity, the success of the FIT model in generating 
intended results entirely depends on a number of factors to be considered in its 
regulatory architecture.39 For instance, various approaches to compensation create 
higher or lower level of price risks to RE investors while having a different impact 
on the principle objective of avoiding “overcompensation” and “overstimulation” 
of the market, among others.40 This issue was significant in Canada – RE where 
adjudicators had to find whether FIT would confer benefit on beneficiaries and 
hence would constitute a “subsidy” under the WTO SCM Agreement.41 The part 
of the case that will be discussed in this article is on the GATT and Trade-related 
Investment Measures (TRIMs) consistency of the localization element of the FIT, 
which was in the form of buy-Ontario requirements coupled with favourable 
tariffs for RE producers.  
B. Panel’s Strategy in GATT/TRIMs: Leaving only a Half-Step for the AB to Save the 
measures!  
The highly contentious FIT regime in the Canada – RE case was implemented by 
the Government of the Province of Ontario and its agencies through the Green 
Energy and Green Economy Act of 2009. 42  Under this law, generators of 
electricity produced from RE were paid a guaranteed price per kilowatt hour 
                                                     
37 Cf. GREENPEACE, ENERGY (R)EVOLUTION, A SUSTAINABLE WORLD ENERGY OUTLOOK 
(2010). Also, in a letter to US Office of Trade Representative dated Oct 18 2012, twelve 
leading environmental NGOs urged that the US, instead of siding with complainants in the 
Canada – Renewable Energy case, should follow the path taken by Ontario. The letter is 
available at http://www.sierraclub.org/trade/downloads/OntarioFIT-
LetterUSTR.pdf. 
38 For instance, Stanford and U California professors recommend the use of FITs in their 
study on a global 100 per cent renewables scenario. See Mark Z. Jacobson & Mark A. 
Delucchi, A Plan for a Sustainable Future: How to get all energy from wind, water and solar power by 
2030, SCIENTIFIC AM. (Nov. 2009).  
39 For a survey of recent studies on why this is the case, see IPCC Report, supra note 29. 
40 Id. at 899. (“It is important to set the right price to avoid overpayment and over- 
stimulation of the market, as well as high costs that might result from supporting 
significant installation of more expensive RE technologies. To this end, some countries 
(e.g., Spain) have established caps on annual payments or set limits on capacity that can 
qualify for payment. The downside of caps is that they reduce investment stability and 
cause frequent stop-and-go in the market. Thus, some countries (e.g., Germany for PV) 
have established ‘growth corridors’ with continuous automatic adjustments of tariffs.” 
41 Canada – Renewable Energy, supra note 1 at Part VII (C); Canada – Renewable Energy AB, 
supra note 30 at section 5.5. 
42 An Act to enact the Green Energy Act of 2009 and to build a green economy, to repeal 
the Energy Conservation Leadership Act of 2006 and the Energy Efficiency Act and to 
amend other statutes, Service Ontario 2009, Chapter 12 (Panel Exhibit JPN-101). 
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(kWh) of electricity delivered into the Ontario electricity system under 20-year or 
40-year contracts. 43  The controversial aspect of the case from a trade law 
perspective related to the "Minimum Required Domestic Content Levels", which 
had to be satisfied in order for RE facilities to be eligible for FIT payments.44 
These buy-local or “local content requirements” (`LCRs’) were summarized in the 
AB report in the following table:  
 
 Wind (FIT) Solar PV (FIT) Solar PV (microFIT) 
Milestone Date for 
Commercial Operation 2009-2011 2012- 2009-2010 2011- 2009-2010* 2011- 
Minimum Required 
Domestic Content Level 25% 50% 50% 60% 40% 60%  
 
The key issue in the first part of the case was whether domestic content 
requirements of Ontario’s FIT Programme and the FIT and micro-FIT Contracts 
(’FIT Programmes’) were in violation of the national treatment principle of GATT 
1994 and the Agreement on TRIMs (‘TRIMs Agreement’). 45  If they were in 
violation, they would possibly be harboured by the exceptions provided in GATT 
Article III:8(a). Under this exception, national treatment obligations (which by 
definition include buy-local provisions) do not apply to “laws, regulations or 
requirements governing the procurement by governmental agencies of products purchased 
                                                     
43 Canada – Renewable Energy AB, supra note 30 at ¶ 1.3.  
44 See id. at ¶ 1.4; Canada – Renewable Energy, supra note 1 at ¶ 7.9.  
45  Agreement on Trade-Related Investment Measures, Apr. 15, 1994, Marrakesh 
Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, Annex 1A, in THE LEGAL TEXTS: 
THE RESULTS OF THE URUGUAY ROUND OF MULTILATERAL TRADE NEGOTIATIONS 143 
(1999), 1868 U.N.T.S. 186, art. 2 provides as follows: 
1. Without prejudice to other rights and obligations under GATT 1994, no Member shall 
apply any TRIM that is inconsistent with the provisions of Article III or Article XI of 
GATT 1994. 
2. An illustrative list of TRIMs that are inconsistent with the obligation of national 
treatment provided for in paragraph 4 of Article III of GATT 1994 and the obligation of 
general elimination of quantitative restrictions provided for in paragraph 1 of Article XI of 
GATT 1994 is contained in the Annex to this Agreement. 
Paragraph 1(a) of Illustrative List in the Annex to the TRIMs Agreement provides: 
1. TRIMs that are inconsistent with the obligation of national treatment provided for in 
paragraph 4 of Article III of GATT 1994 include those which are mandatory or 
enforceable under domestic law or under administrative rulings, or compliance with which 
is necessary to obtain an advantage, and which require: 
(a) the purchase or use by an enterprise of products of domestic origin or from any 
domestic source, whether specified in terms of particular products, in terms of volume or 
value of products, or in terms of a proportion of volume or value of its local production; or 
... 
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for governmental purposes and not with a view to commercial resale or with a view to use in 
the production of goods for commercial sale.”46  
 
The Panel faced little difficulty finding that the contested measures constituted 
TRIM. 47  The very objective of the FIT Programmes was to promote local 
investment in renewable technologies (and hence “investment measures”). 
Domestic content requirements “by definition, always favour the use of domestic 
products over imported products, and therefore affect trade.”48 In fact, Canada 
submitted no argument to the contrary conceding that the FIT measures were 
TRIMs. 
 
Moreover, when it was eventually found, as will be discussed below, that the 
measures were not covered under GATT III:8(a) exceptions, the rest of the case 
(on the violation of the TRIMs Agreement Article 2 and its Paragraph 1(a) of 
Illustrative List in the Annex to that Agreement) seemed straight forward. This was 
firstly because Ontario LCRs clearly “required” (as the text of Paragraph 1(a) of the 
Illustrative List as the FIT Programme provides) electricity generators using solar 
PV and wind power technology to purchase or use RE generation equipment and 
components that are of Canadian origin or from a Canadian source. According to 
evidence submitted by complainants, the effect of the Domestic Content Grids is 
to require that "for all projects", "at least some goods manufactured, formed, or 
assembled in Ontario must be utilized in order to satisfy the Minimum Required 
Domestic Content Levels"49. Secondly, it was considered almost self-evident that 
compliance with the LCR requirements was necessary 50  in order to obtain an 
                                                     
46 General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, Oct. 30, 1947, 61 Stat. A-11, 55 U.N.T.S. 194, 
art. III: 8 (a) emphasis added [hereinafter GATT] 
47  With respect to sequencing, the Panel, against all parties’ arguments, ruled that the 
TRIMs Agreement deals with the issue “most directly, specifically and in detail” (¶ 7.70). 
By doing so, it spared itself from independently examining the requirements of GATT 
Article III: 4 since, according to the Panel, consistency with GATT Article III was already 
implicated in the analysis under TRIMs Article 2. Referring to Appellate Body Report, EC 
– Bananas III, ¶ 204, the Panel did not accept the complainants’ arguments that the SCM is 
lex specialis with respect to the matter at hand and hence should be dealt with first. Although 
the Panel also rejected Canada’s argument for GATT Article III:4 to be the starting point 
of analysis, (Canada – Renewable Energy, supra note 1, ¶ 7.69) it served Canada’s purpose by 
deciding the applicability of GATT Article III:8 (a) exceptions to TRIMs. 
48 Canada – Renewable Energy, supra note 1, ¶ 7.111. 
49 First Written Submission of Japan, Canada – Certain Measures affecting the Renewable Energy 
Generation Sector, WT/DS412, ¶ 173. 
50 The Panel considered it as “evident” that compliance with the "Minimum Required 
Domestic Content Level" was “a necessary condition and prerequisite for electricity 
generators to participate in the FIT Programme.” (¶ 7.165) 
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"advantage", i.e. FIT guaranteed rates.51 Finally, it was held that the FIT measures 
were TRIMs falling within the scope of Paragraph 1(a) of the Illustrative List, and 
that in the light of Article 2.2 and the chapeau to Paragraph 1(a) of the Illustrative 
List, it followed that they were also inconsistent with Article III:4 of the GATT 
1994, and thereby also inconsistent with Article 2.1 of the TRIMs Agreement.52  
 
From a legal theory perspective, the illegality of local content requirements in 
principle or as a rule seemed to be “settled” given the widespread understanding in 
all corners of the WTO interpretive community to that effect. LCRs are a manifest 
case of de jure discrimination (prohibited under GATT Article III) or TRIMS where 
LCRs are explicitly listed in Paragraph 1(a) of Illustrative List in the Annex.53 But 
what was far from clear was the scope of exceptions available under GATT in this 
regard.  
 
Apart from GATT Article XX (b) or (g) environmental exceptions, which were 
never invoked by the respondent, GATT Article III:8 (a), cited above, was 
potentially available to exonerate the Ontario FIT Programmes. The 
Ontario/Canada FIT proceedings were the first instance in which a panel had been 
asked to interpret and apply GATT Article III:8 (a).54 
 
The decisive issue centred around the applicability and the scope of the Article III.8 
(a) exceptions – whether they could function as providing policy space for 
otherwise de jure discriminatory LCRs. On the first issue, rejecting the EU’s 
argument, both the Panel and the AB agreed on the applicability or potential 
availability of GATT Article III:8 (a) exceptions regarding all TRIMS (regardless of 
what provision of the TRIMS Agreement they fall under). 55  Their agreement 
                                                     
51 The Panel agreed with complainants that “mere participation in FIT Programme may be 
viewed as obtaining an "advantage" within the meaning of the chapeau of Paragraph 1(a) of 
the Illustrative List. (See Canada – Renewable Energy, supra note 1, ¶ 7.157 on the test and ¶ 
7.165 on its application to the FIT measures.) 
52 Canada – Renewable Energy, supra note 1 at 7. 166. 
53 Paragraph 1(a) of Illustrative List in the Annex to the TRIMs Agreement provides: 
1. TRIMs that are inconsistent with the obligation of national treatment provided for in 
paragraph 4 of Article III of GATT 1994 include those which are mandatory or 
enforceable under domestic law or under administrative rulings, or compliance with which 
is necessary to obtain an advantage, and which require: 
(a) the purchase or use by an enterprise of products of domestic origin or from any 
domestic source, whether specified in terms of particular products, in terms of volume or 
value of products, or in terms of a proportion of volume or value of its local production; or 
... 
54 Canada – Renewable Energy, supra note 1 at ¶ 7.122. 
55 The AB upheld the Panel’s finding that Paragraph 1(a) of the Illustrative List in the 
Annex to the TRIMs Agreement did not “obviate the need for [the Panel] to undertake an 
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however ceased at that point. While the Panel seemed to be moving towards 
widening the scope for exceptions, the AB flatly excluded the possibility of 
invoking procurement exceptions for FIT-LCR measures. 
 
Breaking up the Article III:8 (a) into three distinct elements, the Panel had 
effectively ruled in favour of Canada in almost the first two-and-a-half steps; that 
is, (i) the challenged measures were to be characterized as "laws, regulations or 
requirements governing procurement" and (ii) the challenged measures involved 
"procurement by governmental agencies". 56  By not being able to establish that 
procurement of electricity was not for “commercial resale” Canada only failed to 
satisfy the second half of element (iii) laid out by the Panel, namely “whether such 
"procurement" is undertaken "for governmental purposes and not with a view to 
commercial resale or with a view to use in the production of goods for commercial 
sale".57 By doing this, Panel kept a glimmer of hope for Ontario/Canada to be 
vindicated at the appeal stage. 
 
According to the Panel, because the Government of Ontario and the municipal 
governments made “profit” from the resale of electricity that was purchased under 
the FIT Programme, and also because electricity resales were made “in 
competition with licensed electricity retailers”, the FIT Programme was undertaken 
"with a view to commercial resale".58 It is beyond the scope of this article to 
discuss how the Panel’s finding, which led to Canada’s failure at the Panel stage,59 
                                                                                                                                  
analysis of whether the challenged measures are outside of the scope of application of 
Article III:4 of the GATT 1994 by virtue of the operation of Article III:8(a) of the GATT 
1994.” Canada – Renewable Energy, supra note 1 at ¶ 7.121; Canada – Renewable Energy AB, 
supra note 30 at ¶ 5.33. 
56 Canada – Renewable Energy, supra note 1 at ¶ 7.122. 
57 Id. at ¶¶ 7.122; 7.151. 
58 Canada – Renewable Energy, supra note 1 at ¶ 7.151. The Panel provided two reasons why it 
was not persuaded by Canada’s arguments and sided with the complainants: firstly because 
of the fact that electricity purchased by the Government of Ontario under the FIT 
Programme was “bought from generators and sold to retail consumers through the same 
channels as all other electricity by Hydro One and LDCs [as state-owned enterprises] in 
competition with private sector electricity retailers.” (¶ 7. 148) Secondly, on the specific 
issue of “profit”, the Panel stated that, although the OPA did not profit from the resale of 
electricity through Hydro One and the LDCs, “it is evident that the Government of 
Ontario and Ontario's municipal governments will profit from these operations.” (¶ 7. 150; 
emphasis added) The Panel was not convinced by Canada that the profit that was made by 
Ontario’s public transmission and distribution companies (Hydro One and LDCs) was 
from the service of “distributing electricity to the end-user rather than any on-sale of the 
renewable electricity.” (¶ 7. 150) 
59 Canada – Renewable Energy, supra note 1 at ¶¶ 7.146- 7.151 and Canada – Renewable Energy 
AB, supra note 30 at ¶¶ 5.69- 5.73. 
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was the only plausible interpretation of the text.60 This debate is somewhat moot, 
however, in light of the fact that the AB eventually reversed the Panel’s finding on 
the very first stage of the above three-tier test, precluding use of the GATT Article 
III:8 (a) exceptions for FIT-LCR regimes of this type. 
 
Overall, the AB’s interpretation of all three elements of GATT Article III:8 (a), 
were decidedly narrower than the Panel’s.61 
 
On the first element, the EU had argued at the panel stage that the domestic 
content requirements imposed by the Government of Ontario did not govern “the 
alleged procurement of electricity, within the meaning of Article III:8(a), because they 
are not requirements related to the subject-matter of the procurement, which is electricity”.62 In 
other words, the EU’s argument was that the FIT’s domestic content requirements 
directly related to the purchase of renewable energy technology and could not be 
conceived as “laws, …” governing procurement of electricity and hence should be 
excluded from the scope of this provision. 63  The Panel disagreed with this 
seemingly overly formalistic argument. Siding with Canada, the Panel convincingly 
argued   LCRs  were “necessary prerequisite for the alleged procurement [of 
electricity] by the Government of Ontario to take place, and to this extent, such 
requirements “govern” the alleged procurement.”64 Interestingly Japan (one of the 
complaints) did not take issue with this finding but the EU asked the AB to reverse 
this finding.65  
 
The AB, taking side with the EU and reversing the Panel, narrowed the availability 
of GATT Article III:8(a) exceptions to situations where the subject of 
discrimination (RE equipment) was “like” (or in competitive relationship with) the 
subject of procurement (RE), which is clearly not the case in FIT-LCR measures.66 
                                                     
60 If “profitization as an overall organization strategy” is accepted to be the core meaning 
of any “commercial activity” and hence “commercial (re-)sale”, it should have sufficed for 
Canada to establish that the setting up of the FIT Programmes as such are not profit-
seeking activities. In this regard, the fact that the other agencies of the Government of 
Ontario make a profit through transmitting (via Hydro One) and distributing (via LDCs) 
electricity (including renewable and non-renewable energy) seems to be irrelevant to the 
issue of government’s “not-for-profit” policy of promoting clean energy generation 
through FIT Programmes. In fact there would have been no need for the Ontario 
Government to “subsidize” renewables – as complainants had argued in the second part of 
the case – in order to enable them to viably compete in the “marketplace”. 
61 Canada – Renewable Energy AB, supra note 30 at ¶¶ 5.54 -5.74. 
62 European Union's response to Panel question No. 22 (first set), ¶ 88. (emphasis added) 
63 Canada – Renewable Energy, supra note 1 at ¶ 7.125. 
64 Id. at ¶ 7.127.  
65 See European Union’s Notification of Appeal, WT/DS426/10 (Feb. 15, 2013).  
66 Id. at ¶ 5.79.  
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The AB therefore found that Ontario LCRs “cannot be characterized as "laws, 
regulations or requirements governing the procurement by governmental agencies" 
of electricity within the meaning of Article III:8(a) of the GATT 1994.”67  
 
The requirement of the competitive relationship laid out by the AB narrows the 
availability of the procurement exceptions since it would only kick in if the 
government directly purchased the domestic products at the expense of imported 
like products. In other words, governments under certain conditions could 
discriminate in favour of their domestic products by excluding imported like 
products from the scope of their purchases, but cannot rely on these procurement 
exceptions if they instruct private buyers to do exactly the same (e.g. purchase domestic 
products like RE equipment) as a condition to receive a favourable treatment (FIT 
payment).  
 
The same distinction is strikingly absent in the parallel subsidies agreement where a 
measure would will be covered under the state-constraining SCM provisions even 
if a financial contribution is provided by private bodies at the instruction of the 
state. 68  The claim for such distinction was also one of the least elaborated 
arguments made in the EU submissions (and was not even invoked by Japan), 
amounted to an “avoidance technique”.69 But being among the most formalist 
venues to limit the availability of exceptions, this argument excused the AB from 
having to deal with the more substantive issues contentiously debated by all the 
parties relating to the scope of the GATT Article III:8 (a).70 
 
                                                     
67 Id.  
68 Contrast this with Article 1.1 (a) (1) (iv) of the Subsidies (of the SCM) Agreement where 
a measure would still be regarded as a “financial contribution” by a government if the latter 
“entrusts or directs a private body to carry out one or more of the type of functions 
illustrated in (i) to (iii) above which would normally be vested in the government and the 
practice, in no real sense, differs from practices normally followed by governments”.  
69  See Robert E. Hudec, GATT Dispute Settlement After the Tokyo Round: An Unfinished 
Business, 13 CORNELL INT’L L. J. 145, 189-92 (1980).  
70 What had occupied the vast majority of the submissions by both parties as well as the 
“friends of the court” was on the meaning of “procurement” in the context of Article III 
(whether it meant only government purchase for own use) and “commercial (re-)sale” 
(whether it necessarily involved gaining profit). See Amicus Curiae submissions by 
International Institute for Sustainable Development (IISD), Canadian Environmental Law 
Association (CELA), and Ecojustic Canada dated 10 May 2012. Also see Amicus Curiae 
submissions of Blue Green Canada, Canadian Auto Workers, Canadian Federation of 
Students, Canadian Union of Public Employees Communications, Energy and 
Paperworkers Union of Canada Council of Canadians Ontario Public Service Employees 
Union, May 2012. 
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Revisiting the issue from a legal realist lens, the formalistic legal arguments 
presented by all sides were a veneer over the complex web of internal and external 
forces fighting an ideological and a distributional battle in which the WTO verdict 
eventually played a definitive role. Internally, the Ontario FIT Programmes were a 
production of a Liberal government in the face of fierce Conservative opposition, 
on whose agenda a state-centred RE policy was not a priority.71 Such ideological 
conflict could also be traced in the broader context of Ontario’s costly and failed 
experience with “market restructuring”, which swung back towards a hybrid-
regulated price system in 2002, where clean energy was designated as part and 
parcel of security of supply. 72  There were also a number of concrete local 
distributional implications. These ranged from the question of higher retail prices 
impacting economically vulnerable or environmentally insensitive consumers, to 
the issue of disgruntled local municipalities and anti-wind groups regarding the 
siting of wind projects.73  
 
At the centre of the external battle was a $7 billion deal signed by the Government 
of Ontario with a Korean consortium spearheaded by Samsung. The Korean 
consortium pledged to create green manufacturing jobs in Ontario in exchange for 
FIT payments and priority access to the electricity grid. The deal was of key 
importance in enticing the Japanese and Europeans to bring a case against Canada 
at the WTO.74 A further dynamic in the domestic constitutional sphere, was the 
fact that the Conservative Federal Government of Canada was put in an 
uncomfortable position of defending a Liberal law. Only half-heartedly making a 
case on behalf of Ontario, it decided not to invoke environmental exceptions of 
the GATT Article XX. The Canadian Government left it to other Members 
engaged in ongoing and future disputes to test the viability of environmentally-
induced LCRs on those specific grounds. 
                                                     
71 For a detailed account of the story see John Loring, Ontario's search for a solar system, THE 
GLOBE & MAIL (Feb. 24, 2011), http://www.theglobeandmail.com/report-on-
business/rob-magazine/ontarios-search-for-a-solar-
system/article575570/?page=all. 
72 See Canada – Renewable Energy, supra note 1 at ¶ 7.291. 
73  Diane Bailey, Analysis - Policy upheaval fuels fears for future of Ontario wind market, WIND 
POWER MONTHLY (June 5, 2013), 
http://www.windpowermonthly.com/article/1185057/analysis---policy-upheaval-
fuels-fears-future-ontario-wind-market (“One thing the new approach will do is give 
municipalities more control over where turbines are sited, added the spokesman. The wind 
industry in Ontario has run into sometimes fierce opposition in rural communities that felt 
sidelined by the current approvals process.”). 
74 Karen Howlett & Renata D’Aliesio, How Samsung became an Ontario election flashpoint, THE 
GLOBE & MAIL (Sept. 29, 2011) 
http://www.theglobeandmail.com/news/politics/how-samsung-became-an-
ontario-election-flashpoint/article596188/.  
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Given this background – which is present in different forms in all transnational 
legal disputes, including legal trade issues – one can hardly buy the formalist view 
that an international judicial body like the AB would always imagine its role as 
“discovering” the most accurate interpretation of the text with no regard the 
political implications of its decisions.75 There are circumstances in which judges 
feel less constrained than others both internally (the extent to which they personally 
view an interpretation to be superior) and externally with a view on their credibility 
within the interpretive community and how their decisions would be received by 
their “audience”. As stated at the outset, contrary to the scope of the rule (that Ontario 
LCRs violate of Article 2.2 and Para 1 (a) of the Illustrative list of the Annex of the 
TRIMs Agreement and Article III:4 of the GATT 1994), the scope of exceptions under 
GATT Article III:8(a) seemed to be reasonably open to opposing interpretations. 
In a broader sense, just as Canada made a “sovereign” decision not to invoke 
GATT Article XX environmental exceptions, the AB’s decision to limit the scope 
of GATT Article III:8 (a) exceptions to the exclusion of FIT-LCRs is akin to what 
Agamben describes as “the political”.76 This is not to reduce law to politics – as law 
is regarded in a Webern tradition as a relatively autonomous sphere with a distinct 
vocabulary and language – but to consider international law as a “continuation of 
politics” however in the legal terrain.77  
 
In a strategically formalist78 method of adjudication, the AB decided to “split the 
difference” or stakes among various conflicting interests present in the disputes.79 
                                                     
75 Similarly in the case of the second and third elements cited above, one could argue that 
there were equally valid arguments on both sides. Without going into any detail, one could 
mention for instance, Canada’s reference to Sue Arrowsmith, Government Procurement in 16 
THE WTO: STUDIES IN TRANSNATIONAL ECONOMIC LAW, 53 (2002), arguing that the EU 
had overlooked academic commentary, suggesting that "it is clear" that requirements 
imposed on the inputs into products purchased by the government fall within the scope of 
Article III:8(a) of the GATT 1994. See Appellate Body Report, Canada – Renewable Energy, 
supra note 1 at fn 253.  
76 GIORGIO AGAMBEN, STATE OF EXCEPTION (2005). 
77  See generally M KOSKENNEIEMI, FROM APOLOGY TO UTOPIA: THE STRUCTURE OF 
INTERNATIONAL LEGAL ARGUMENT (2006) [hereinafter M KOSKENNEIEMI].  
78 For a well-known critique of “empty formalism” in AB’s decisions see Robert Hudec, 
GATT/WTO Constraints on National Regulation: Requiem for an 'Aims and Effects 'test', INT’L 
LAWYER 32 (1998). For arguments in favour of what Hudec called “avoidance techniques” 
for politically sensitive issues to diminish the probability of severe political correction see 
Richard H. Steinberg, Judicial Law-making at the WTO: Discursive, Constitutional, and Political 
Constraints, 98 AM. J. INT’L L. 247, 257–67 (2004). 
79  A difference-splitting judge is one who “works out what the “ideologues”, his 
constrained activist colleagues, would see as the optimal liberal and conservative rule 
interpretations, and then chooses an interpretation that lie in between.” See DUNCAN 
KENNEDY, CRITIQUE OF ADJUDICATION 184 (1998).  
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Based on this strategy, which politically might well have made sense under the 
circumstances, FIT-LCRs were declared illegal under the GATT and at the same 
time exonerated (at least tentatively) under the SCM Agreement, which is not 
discussed in this article. This way, the real decision about the eventual WTO legality 
of FIT-LCRs was postponed to when and if a Member would be willing to defend 
them on environmental grounds by invoking GATT Article XX.  
 
III. “GREEN INDUSTRIALIZATION” AS TRADE PROTECTIONISM?  
In order to understand “Green Industrialization”, it is pertinent to examine the 
competing rationales for the same. Green industrialization can be defined to 
include any measure of “industrial policies” intended to encourage local 
investment and production. These are policies not only in the clean energy sector 
but in any sector where the policy would create positive externalities for the local 
or the global environment.80 The regulatory instruments used as part of this green 
industrial policy might range from Pigouvian tax/ subsidies to tariffs and LCRs, to 
any rent-creating measure that would temporarily and disproportionately shift “rents” 
inwards under certain conditions to create social spill-over effects.  
 
There are two distinct questions here: an old question and a new one. The old 
question is the credibility of any rent-shifting trade policy, including the narrow 
case for “strategic trade” policies and the more controversial case of “infant 
industry”. The traditional arguments within mainstream trade and development 
policy circles rejecting rent-shifting trade policy are all well-rehearsed. The new 
question concerns the possibility of creating “additional” environmental benefits as 
a result of localization policies, as well as the implications of such policies for the 
law of international trade.  
 
On the old question, it is no surprise that the WTO law should hold a generally 
hostile view towards “industrial policies” per se. This is reflected in its flat rejection 
of de jure discrimination, export and import-substituting subsidies, TRIMs, etc. 
The hostility is historically rooted in the fact that the WTO emerged in the mid-
1980s post-ISI era. At that time the role of the “state” in inducing economic 
growth in general, and its ability to “pick winners” in particular, was largely 
discredited in the neo-liberal spirit of the era.81 Any measure aimed at “localizing” 
production of certain goods, was recast in this neo-liberal atmosphere as 
“protectionist” (unless it falls under the narrow category of Special and Differential 
                                                     
80 For a broader definition see Mark Wu & James Salzman, The Next Generation of Trade and 
Environment Disputes: The Rise of Green Industrial Policy, 108 NW. U. L. REV. (forthcoming 
2014). 
81 See generally J CYPHER & J DIETZ, THE PROCESS OF ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT (2nd ed. 
2006) [hereinafter CYPHER & DIETZ].  
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Treatment) and in breach of the spirit of the WTO’s constitution and the text of 
provisions such as paragraph 1 of Article III of the GATT and its various 
subsequent paragraphs, i.e. de jure discrimination under Para 2 if in the form of tax 
discrimination between domestic and imported “like products” or “treatment less 
favourable“ in other cases of regulatory discrimination under Para4.  
  
In light of the anti-localization bias embedded in the WTO, it is little surprise that 
“industrialization” per se would never be thought of as a distinct legitimate ground 
for “policy exceptions”. This is in direct contrast with what Ruggie calls the 
“embedded liberal” spirit of the “Bretton Woods compromise” where the non-
discrimination principle was balanced with a number of gaps and loopholes in the 
system. The gaps and loopholes included the notorious “grandfathering rights”, 
very loose subsidy disciplines, permissive safeguard mechanism, legally weak 
dispute settlement mechanism, and permissibility of cross country “arrangements” 
such as voluntary export restraints (VERs) which was prevalent in the 1980s, 
among others.82  
 
In recent years, however, a new wave of economic development theories that 
warrant specific forms of “industrial policies” have gained traction.83 Most notably, 
Rodrik relies on new institutional economic approaches to devise what he 
perceives as sensible industrial policy. 84  One should not forget however that 
neoclassical micro-analytic approaches were also not conclusive on the “efficiency” 
of “Strategic Trade Policy” (as a narrowly defined category which justifies trade 
intervention)85 and even the broader “infant industry” arguments, which could 
theoretically be justified on dynamic efficiency grounds.86 Despite the theoretically 
                                                     
82 See J Ruggie, International Regimes, Transactions, and Change: Embedded Liberalism in the Postwar 
Economic Order, 36(2) INT’L ORG. (1982). See also R Howse & K Nicolaidis, Legitimacy and 
Global Governance: Why Constitutionalizing the WTO is Step too Far?, in EFFICIENCY, EQUITY, 
LEGITIMACY: THE MULTILATERAL TRADING SYSTEM AT THE MILLENNIUM 227 (RB 
Porter, A Subramanian, P Sauvé, & AB Zampetti eds. 2001). 
83 See DANI RODRIK, supra note 26 at 119. According to Rodrik, “[a]nytime, a government 
consciously favors some economic activity over others, it is conducting industrial policy.” 
84 For a critical overview of the contribution of New Institutional Economics to law and 
development expertise see Thomas, supra note 21.  
85  Strategic trade policy was a controversial topic especially during the 1980s. While 
theorists such as J. Brander, B. Spencer, L. Thurow, L. Tyson, among others, advocated 
strategic trade policy others such as A. Dixit, G. Grossman, J. Eaton, J. Bhagwati criticized 
this policy. For a rather nuanced view see PAUL KRUGMAN, STRATEGIC TRADE POLICY 
AND INTERNATIONAL ECONOMICS (1986). 
86  For a classic text defining “protectionism” see J. BHAGWATI, PROTECTIONISM 127 
(1988). As the most prominent critique of “protection-led infancy arguments”, Bhagwati 
has been clear that the question is not about whether but how state interventions best correct 
market failure. In “Protectionism” he not only emphasized the desirability of certain 
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plausible arguments in favour of a certain category of rent-shifting trade policies, 
there remains a generally dismissive attitude towards such cases of state 
intervention. This attitude can be explained by the dominance of public choice 
school theory as a lens through which to view the political economy of trade. 
According to the well-known state scepticism of public choice theory, 
governments are worse than the private sector at “picking winners” due to the lack 
of information, and more importantly, because of their vulnerability to capture by 
rent seeking special interests.87 
 
The success of export-led growth strategies in high-performing East Asian 
economies has brought into question these two longstanding justifications for 
resisting intervention. In light of the new institutional economics, a fundamental 
revision of the mainstream trade and development theories is taking place. The 
revised theories rely on contextualized empirical evidence as well as the alternative 
political economic frameworks such as the one provided by Peter Evans.88 WTO 
law increasingly pays attention to Rodrik’s notion of “policy space” for developing 
countries,89 although the notion has not been accepted in dominant discourses of 
trade “protectionism”.  
 
This brings us to the second question in the context of trade linkage with the 
environment: is it possible, or sensible, to defend certain industrial policies in the 
name of environmental protection as a legitimate policy exception within the 
current GATT/WTO system? This question may resurface in any future challenge 
of “localized” FITs where the member adopting the measure would be willing to 
invoke GATT XX exceptions (unlike Canada who did not invoke the exceptions). 
Would it be possible for a respondent to argue that domestic content requirements 
in a specific case are “relating”90 or even “necessary”91 to further environmental 
objectives? 
 
Here one can initially distinguish distinct sets of externalities to be addressed by 
FIT as such on the one hand and LCRs on the other. By regulating higher fees for 
RE than for conventional energy, the FIT as such, aims to directly internalize 
                                                                                                                                  
government interventions in general and defended government interventions such as 
certain export subsidies, Bhagwati opined that international codes and national rulings that 
reflect the belief that all export subsidies are necessarily reprehensible and destroy fair 
competition are based on egregious fallacies.  
87 For a brief overview see M TREBILCOCK, UNDERSTANDING TRADE LAW 7 (2013). For 
more see P KRUGMAN & M OBSTFELD, INTERNATIONAL ECONOMICS: THEORY AND 
PRACTICE 255-81 (6th ed., 2003) [hereinafter KRUGMAN & OBSTFELD].  
88 See P EVANS, supra note 20.  
89 See Hoekman, supra note 28.  
90 GATT, supra note 47, art. XX(g).  
91 Id. at art. XX (b). 
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environmental externalities as well as promote energy security through diversification. 
The LCR provisions of the FIT, on the other hand, arguably aim at internalizing 
information and coordination externalities as typical justifications for Rodrikian 
industrial policy. 92  In the end however, a successful industrial policy could be 
described as “green” to the extent that the industrial element of the programme 
makes additional contributions93 to the environmental objective pursued either by 
creating more dynamism in the sector leading to more competition and innovation 
in the long term or simply by making its very existence a political possibility. Before 
addressing the controversial question of political feasibility, I will examine the issue 
from the perspective of environmental and economic modes of thought as 
reflecting distinct sets of “institutionalized rationalities”. 
 
A. The environmental rationale  
Before returning to the familiar terrain of trade legal discourse it is necessary to 
examine the competing discourses propagated in environmental and energy circles 
of expertise.  
 
There is a growing body of literature on how the complex regulatory landscape of 
green energy policy, which has developed over time in various parts of the world, 
should be mapped out to better facilitate learning from stories of success and 
failure. In one of the most comprehensive literature surveys undertaken as a 
“Special Report of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change” (IPCC 
Special Report),94 the use of general criteria for policy evaluation (“effectiveness”, 
“efficiency”, “equity” and “institutional feasibility”) was balanced with a very 
nuanced language that reflects a conscious decision to avoid the pretence of 
“replicating success” in contextually divergent environments.  
 
The IPCC Special Report explicitly asserts that there is no globally agreed list of 
RE policy options or even groupings.95As a matter of practicality and based on 
numerous case studies, it moves on to investigate the pros and cons of diverse 
approaches to RE deployment policy under the banner of “regulation”. This 
includes “price-driven” policies with the prominent example of the general FIT 
model (which subject to certain policy requirements remains on the top of the list 
of successful RE policies worldwide), followed by “quantity driven” policies (e.g. 
                                                     
92 DANI RODRIK, supra note 26 at 99-153. Rodrik’s theory of industrial policy is based on 
internalization of information and coordination externalities. 
93 Cosbey and Mavroidis construct an environmental additionality argument based on the 
Bastable test provided by Kent (1960). According to the Bastable test “an industrial policy 
measure is worthwhile if the total costs of support are outweighed by the present 
discounted value of the benefits derived.” See Cosbey & Mavroidis supra note 16 at 15.  
94 IPCC Report, supra note 29. 
95 See id. at 883.  
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RE portfolio standards), as well as access issues (priority or guaranteed access, 
priority dispatch, etc.).96 Other “deployment polices”, which, depending on local 
contextual elements, complement the big regulatory picture are “fiscal incentives” 
(e.g. grant, tax credit, tax reduction or exemption, etc.) and “public finance” (e.g. 
loans, loan guarantees, public procurement). The relevant inquiry is not which of 
these measures are “better”, but, which combination of measures is more likely to 
work (or not) under what circumstances.97  
 
In an increasingly context-specific fashion and a humble tone, RE policy 
terminology is becoming very similar to what Rodrik describes as learning through 
mistakes (and yes, governments will inevitably pick losers such as Solyndra98) as an 
essential part of any sensible industrial policy. 99  Like Rodrik’s emphasis on 
institutions, a group of studies on RE deployment policies cite a number of 
broader elements of an “enabling environment” that would create synergy for RE 
specific policies rendering them more effective.100  
 
More significantly for our problem here, the studies show that the localization of RE 
energy production, one way or another, has been historically present in major RE 
deployment programmes worldwide. For instance, Denmark and Germany, as first 
movers in the wind industry, provided “soft loans” for wind projects that had 
significant local content. They also created customs duties that favoured the 
import of components over fully assembled wind turbines.101 On the export side, 
                                                     
96 See id. Table 11.2 at 890-1.  
97  See id.For instance, the effectiveness of fiscal incentives such as tax reductions or 
exemptions depends on the level of applicable tax rate (de Jager and Rathmann, 2008). “In 
the Nordic countries, which apply relatively high energy tax rates, such tax exemptions can 
be sufficient to stimulate the use of renewable electricity; however, in countries with 
relatively low energy tax rates, they must be combined with other measures” (European 
Commission, 2005). See id. at 891 and citations therein.  
98 Solyndra was a US solar cell manufacturer that went bankrupt after having received more 
than a half-billion dollars in government loan guarantees. Rodrik however argues that “the 
Solyndra case cannot be properly evaluated without taking into account the many successes 
that the program has spawned. Tesla Motors, which received a $465 million loan guarantee 
in 2009, has seen its shares soar and has repaid its loan early. An evaluation of US 
Department of Energy efficiency programs found that the net benefits amounted to $30 
billion – an excellent return for an investment of roughly $7 billion over 22 years (in 1999 
dollars).” See Rodrik, The Right Green Industrial Policies, PROJECT SYNDICATE (July 11, 2013), 
http://www.project-syndicate.org/commentary/the-right-green-industrial-policies-
by-dani-rodrik [hereinafter Rodrik]. 
99 “If governments make no mistakes, they are not trying hard enough.” See DANI RODRIK, 
supra note 26 at 116. 
100 See id. Table 11.4 at 918-9. 
101 Oliver Johnson, Exploring the Effectiveness of Local Content Requirements in Promoting Solar PV 
Manufacturing in India 9 (German Development Institute, Discussion Paper 11/2013) 
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provision of export credit assistance and development aid has been prevalent not 
only in Denmark and Germany but also the US.102 It is interesting to note that 
today, at the same time that the US deploys the rhetoric of “protectionism” in its 
dispute against the Indian RE scheme, the US Export-Import Bank and the 
Overseas Private Investment Corporation are effectively subsidizing “American 
content” in Indian solar projects. The “American content” is thin film, which is 
not included in the Indian LCR and is also subject to US export credits, leading to 
its large exports to the Indian market.103  
As a general rule, the role of LCRs in impeding the environmental objectives of 
RE deployment policies is less than conclusive. Trying to learn from the Chinese 
experience thus far in promoting a successful wind industry using LCRs, Kuntze 
and Moerenhout offer a framework for the effectiveness of these measures in 
terms of spurring learning by doing. This includes providing additional subsidies to 
neutralize the additional short run costs created by the localization policy.104 In this 
vein, Veloso also suggest that LCRs are more likely to generate positive welfare 
effects if they are prepared in coordination with local businesses before 
implementation and are coupled with some form of subsidy.105 Johnson also cites a 
number of studies to conclude that LCRs must be “linked with other policies that 
support and catalyse learning”.106 In the context of examining the conditions for 
achieving successful localization in wind power, Lewis and Wiser conclude that 
“policy incentives may need to be designed and targeted differently depending on 
the specific goals for localization.”107While pointing to the complexity of designing 
a successful RE localization model, these studies clearly do not rule out LCRs as 
tools for achieving such a goal.   
                                                                                                                                  
http://unctad.org/meetings/en/Contribution/DITC_TED_13062013_Study_G
DI.pdf [hereinafter Oliver Johnson]. 
102  Domestic content requirements for renewable energy manufacturing 12 (Sustainable Prosperity 
Policy Brief, 2012). 
103 “The Jawaharlal Nehru National Solar Mission (JNNSM) initiative mandates a domestic 
content requirement, however, only for crystalline PV and not for thin-film.” See Nilima 
Choudhury, Update: Indian solar industry suffocated by US thin-film manufacturers, PV TECH, (Aug. 
20 2012), http://www.pv-
tech.org/news/indian_solar_industry_suffocated_by_us_thin_film_manufacturers. 
104 Jan-Christoph Kuntze & Tom Moerenhout, Local Content Requirements and the Renewable 
Energy Industry - A Good Match? (ICTSD, May 2013) [hereinafter Kuntze & Moerenhout]. 
105 Francisco Veloso, Local content requirements and industrial development: Economic analysis and 
cost modeling of the automotive supply chain, Engineering Systems Division, Massachusetts 
Institute of Technology 216 (2001) cited in id. at 10. 
106 Oliver Johnson, supra note 104 at 12.  
107 Lewis & Wiser, Fostering a renewable energy technology industry: An international comparison of 
wind industry policy support mechanisms 35(3) ENERGY POL’Y 1844, 1846 (2007). 
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B. The indeterminacy of the efficiency rationale 
 
Let’s turn back to the “toolbox” that the economic rationalities provide. This part 
argues that the efficiency arguments are indeterminate as to the potential of 
localization policies in making additional contribution to environmental objectives.  
 
As discussed at the outset, there are two conflicting modes of reasoning regarding 
the overall efficiency of green industrial polices: Static efficiency considerations 
coupled with public choice theory are highly sceptic of the potential “green-ness” 
of any industrial policy. Dynamic efficiency grounds, on the other hand, coupled 
with insights from institutionalism and alternative political economic frameworks, 
as well as other modes of argument, make a case for the plausibility of certain 
green industrial policies. 
 
The anti-localization mode of argument is straightforward: domestic content laws 
would undermine the objective of environmental protection since they would 
impede access to the most efficient environmental technology.  
 
From this “static” efficiency perspective, subsidies or any other localization 
policies ought to be least trade restrictive, that is, promotion of the environmental 
activity with the least distortion on intra-green-industry competition. For instance, 
non-discriminatory subsidization of the “consumption” of environmentally 
friendly goods (such as clean energy or energy efficient products) would not distort 
trade and it would promote the environment by encouraging cost-reducing and 
innovation-enhancing competition. FIT programmes promoting the use of 
renewable technology (wind turbines, solar panels, etc.) regardless of their 
domestic origin are cited as examples in point.108  
 
The static efficiency perspective views adding any elements to industrialize clean 
energy (such as FIT-LCRs), that aim to produce “environmental public goods”, or 
the so-called green collar jobs at home, as “protectionist”. These policies would 
only increase the “cost” of desired goods or services, which would in turn inhibit 
their wide deployment.109  
  
This win-win narrative of “free trade” and environment is dominant in what 
radical critics label as “neoliberal environmentalism”. 110  It seems politically 
                                                     
108 See S Lester, The Problem of Subsidies as a Means of Protectionism: Lessons from the WTO EC – 
Aircraft Case, 12 MELBOURNE J. INT’L L. 1-28 (2011).  
109 For the notions of static and dynamic efficiency see CYPHER & DIETZ, supra note 84, 
chapter 4.  
110 Cf. C OKEREKE, GLOBAL JUSTICE AND NEOLIBERAL ENVIRONMENTAL GOVERNANCE: 
ETHICS, SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT AND INTERNATIONAL CO-OPERATION (2008).  
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appealing and may in fact work well in certain cases, such as free trade agreements 
on environmental goods and services.111 However there is a growing appreciation, 
even within the mainstream economists, for some forms of infant industry policy 
to be applied in the RE context. Apart from Rodrik’s vigorous defense of green 
industrialization,112 Frankel, for instance has also argued that “temporary moderate 
subsidies” might expand the industry. This would create economies of scale and 
the opportunity for learning-by-doing, which could then bring down costs 
sharply.113  
 
Moreover, a wholly different dynamic will emerge when the discourse changes 
from “subsidies” aimed at creating or boosting a domestic industry, to “subsidized” 
solar panels, glass and wind towers sweeping export markets (such as the Chinese 
case). In many of those cases, a win-win case might be made for eliminating anti-
subsidy tariffs (countervailing duties) as well as antidumping measures, rather than 
by “subsidies” or “dumping”.114 In any event, there is a constant battle, at both 
policy and discursive level, regarding green industrial policy, with “success” and 
“failure” stories to corroborate each case.115  
 
Given the indeterminacy of economic arguments overall and in light of the 
growing consciousness in energy and environmental studies regarding the potential 
merits of green industrial policy, it is most reasonable to accommodate a green 
industrial “policy space” as part of country’s “right to regulate”.116 This must be 
one case in which environmental concerns would trump trade interests and hence 
                                                     
111 For ongoing WTO debates on the Eliminating trade barriers on environmental goods 
and services see 
http://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/envir_e/envir_neg_serv_e.htm. 
112 Rodrik, supra note 101.  
113 See Jeffery Frankel, Protectionist Shadows over Solar Power, PROJECT SYNDICATE Aug. 1, 
2013, http://www.project-syndicate.org/commentary/a-damaging-end-to-the-eu-china-
dumping-dispute-by-jeffrey-frankel.  
114 Cf. id. 
115 For a recent general account on success and failure stories claiming overall positive 
performance of green industrial policy see Rodrik supra note 101. For an overly sceptic 
account of all kinds of renewable energy subsidies see Bjørn Lomborg, The Decline of 
Renewable Energy, PROJECT SYNDICATE, http://www.project-
syndicate.org/commentary/the-falling-share-of-renewables-in-global-energy-
production-by-bj-rn-lomborg.  
116  See Appellate Body Report, China — Measures Affecting Trading Rights and Distribution 
Services for Certain Publications and Audio-visual Entertainment Products, ¶ 233, 
WT/DS363/AB/R (Dec. 21, 2009). 
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be justifiable under GATT Article XX (b) – measures “necessary” to protect 
public life or health.117 
 
The consistency of localized FITs could meet the requirements of Article XX (b) 
under the existing paradigms. The EC – Retreaded Tyres is relevant as the AB 
indicated that in cases where the interest at stake is high (in that case climate 
change), it is easier for members to pass the XX (b) threshold.118 The second and 
third elements stated by the AB are also present: localized RE promotion policies 
could potentially contribute to the objective pursued, as indicated above. Finally, 
these measures are typically part of any broader strategies to tackle climate 
change.119 In interpreting scope of application of all these elements, adjudicators 
should look beyond the WTO’s traditional lens (win-win) and open up to 
competing economic and environmental rationalities developed elsewhere in the 
some mainstream and heterodox circles of development and environment 
expertise.  
 
GATT Article XX (b) exceptions should be available regardless of the choice of 
localization instrument. That would include the invocation of policy exceptions for 
GATT Article II if tariffs were instrument of choice, GATT Article III paragraph 
2 in the case of tax discrimination, as well as paragraph 4 in the case of regulatory 
discrimination including LCRs. However, this proposition regarding the neutrality 
of instrumental choice is not shared by many micro-economists who are more 
averse to LCRs than to subsidies.  
 
In a recent study cutting across various sectors including RE, Hufbaer et al (from 
the Institute for International Economics) discovered 117 LCR measures proposed 
or implemented since 2008. 120  LCRs in particular have rarely been used until 
recently as instruments of RE localization. One prominent exception is the case of 
China, however, which has long used them as part and parcel of its successful 
mixed policy approach to developing a strong local wind industry. This recent 
trend, which transcends the developed and developing countries divide, has led to 
                                                     
117 They may also be justifiable under item (g) although with measures relating to the 
conservation of natural resources, there is an additional condition of even-handedness (“if 
such measures are made effective in conjunction with restrictions on domestic production 
or consumption”) that needs to be met before one can jump into the Chapeau 
requirements. See Appellate Body Report, United States — Standards for Reformulated and 
Conventional Gasoline, ¶ 20, WT/DS2/AB/R (Apr. 29, 1996). 
118  Appellate Body Report, Brazil — Measures Affecting Imports of Retreaded Tyres, ¶ 170, 
WT/DS332/AB/R (Dec. 3, 2007). 
119 Id. at ¶¶ 154-5.  
120 GARY CLYDE HUFBAUER, JEFFREY J. SCHOTT, CATHLEEN CIMINO, MARTIN VIEIRO & 
ERIKA WADA, LOCAL CONTENT REQUIREMENTS: A GLOBAL PROBLEM xxi (2013) 
[hereinafter HUFBAUER ET AL.]. 
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a string of WTO cases and seems to have raised alarms within the trade/economic 
circle as rising “protectionism”. 
 
Reviewing the economics literature on LCRs, which falls well short of a theoretical 
consensus on the subject121, Hufbauer et al voices a deep scepticism about the 
utility of LCRs in effectively achieving their multiple objectives, which include 
employment, infant industry, development and, in the case of RE technology, 
protecting the environment. 122  Relying largely on a microeconomic efficiency 
analysis and rent seeking theory, their conclusion is that tariffs and subsidies 
constitute a “less bad economic choice”.123  
 
Between tariffs and subsidies, the literature has historically been more favourable 
towards the latter as “second best” (or less bad) instruments.124 From a micro 
efficiency perspective, tariffs are considered to be more “distortive” because there 
are equivalent to a tax on consumers (as they increase prices) as well as a subsidy on 
local producers.125 However, from a transparency perspective, it can be argued that 
tariffs are more visible than subsidies and should therefore be preferred.126 
 
But in weighing and balancing these alternative measures which have certain 
unique formal characteristics and political implications, it should not be forgotten 
that each of these measures play a similar rent-creating role. They are all measures 
of “local preference” that could even have an identical rent or “protectionist 
impact” measured through a single figure of tariff incidence.127 These alternative 
measures of rent creation span a much longer list. They include the more obvious 
cases such as various forms of fiscal or financial incentives and government 
procurement as well as the so-called “contingent” measures of protection such as 
anti-subsidy and anti-dumping. They equally include less visible cases of rent 
creation such as the use of foreign aid to buy donating-country products, 
extraterritorial application of domestic jurisdiction or the (over-) protection of 
intellectual property. Many of these measures (or a combination of them) could 
amount to pure protectionism or a sensible policy depending on their architectural 
details and political and contextual circumstances.  
                                                     
121 Cf. id. at 9 citing literature on the conditions for effectiveness of LCRs in achieving their 
goals.  
122 Id. at 1-11.  
123 Id. at xx. 
124 J N Bhagwati & V K Ramaswami, Domestic Distortions, Tariffs, and the Theory of Optimum 
Subsidy, 71(1) J. POL. ECON. (1963). 
125 KRUGMAN & OBSTFELD, supra note 90. 
126 Cf. P MAVROIDIS, P A MESSERLIN, & J M WAUTERS, THE LAW AND ECONOMICS OF 
CONTINGENT PROTECTION IN THE WTO 296 (2008). 
127 Hufbauer et al. estimate that the tariff equivalent of reduced trade as a result of LCRs is 
10 percent ad valorem. See HUFBAUER ET AL., supra note 123 at xxi. 
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Moreover, at the implementation level, concerns raised by Hufbaer et al about lack 
of transparency, cost-benefit efficiency128 and most importantly the need for sunset 
provisions requiring these “protective” measures to phase out over time, could be 
raised with respect to other forms of rents (tariffs, quotas, subsidies). Rather than 
providing justification for their rejection outright, these concerns could be 
addressed directly, for instance by enhancing transparency, or enforcing sunset 
provisions, if LCRs prove to be the right tool for achieving declared objectives.129  
In fact, in the case of Ontario FIT programme, one could come up with a long list 
of possible other shortcomings that could be rectified including, (1) the lack of 
setting specific installation or generation targets in Ontario’s significant RE 
market,130 (2) the steep level of high content requirements in a short period of time 
partially contributing to an estimated 17% rise in retail electricity in one year,131 
and, more importantly, (3) the fact that the Green Energy and Green Economy 
Act entirely overlooked training and education as arguably “two crucial 
components for building know-how to increase the pace of learning-by-doing and 
innovation.”132  
 
Rather than scrapping the whole FIT-LCR regime, which seems to have largely 
occurred after Canada lost the case in the WTO, these possible architectural 
defects could be amended to reflect the lessons learned in the world of RE policy 
making. None of these debates and considerations, however, currently figures in 
the one-dimensional lens of the WTO where the system is skewed in favor of the 
“least trade restrictive” environmental measures (win-win discourse of trade and 
environment).  
 
C. Political feasibility rationale  
 
Efficiency and environmental rationales of localization policies aside, one could 
argue that in a lot of cases, politically costly environmental policies will never see 
                                                     
128 Hufbauer et al. roughly estimate that in the case of wind turbines in Canada, Ontario 
paid an extra $300 million and Quebec paid an extra $200 million as a result of their LCRs. 
See id. at xxii.  
129 This is an important “if” – and the larger the amount of rent created through LCRs (e.g. 
mandatory high percentage of local content), the bigger the need for them to be deeply 
scrutinized. 
130 See Kuntze and Moerenhout, supra note 107 at 21. 
131 Id. at 22.  
132 Id. at 33. There are also questions whether the jobs created as a result of LCR aspect of 
the programme were sustainable (in terms of the number of temporary construction jobs as 
opposed to more permanent jobs), and whether there were worth the extra millions it 
added to the cost of the FIT policy. 
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the light of the day without carving out some rents for affected domestic 
constituencies. Could this political feasibility rationale justify an exception to trade 
rules? 
 
Cosbey and Mavroidis flatly dismiss such justifications. They argue that 
“[P]rotectionist measures are inherently politically popular, so it would be unwise 
to open a door for measures on the grounds that they were a necessary evil to 
enable the passage of some good policy.”133 However, debates around how to 
build a constituency of support for an otherwise unpopular measure have always 
been a fact of life in everyday policy making especially in an environment where 
political stakes are high. On the other hand, what appears as a “good policy” – say 
in terms of efficiency – on paper is worth nothing if it does not have a chance of 
materializing. Therefore, providing free carbon allowances to energy intensive 
industries might prove a “necessary evil” for building a successful cap and trade 
system. 134  Or politicians will prefer production subsidies over Pareto superior 
“direct payments” to farmers because subsidies are politically less costly, although 
less efficient means of agricultural support.135  
 
In this sense, could one argue for “trade protection” being a necessary cost of an 
environmental policy? Here once again, deconstructing the dominant discourse of 
“trade protectionism” in this specific context provides insight. The notorious 
notion of protectionism has been historically associated with rent-seeking industries 
such as steel and farm sectors in the US and the EU, in situations where the 
measure in question (tariff, subsidy, etc.) benefited a very small segment of a 
population at the expense of taxpayers and consumers. One could argue, however, 
that the context of green industrial policy is a different situation. The state’s 
creation of new rents in the form of lucrative RE markets could not only benefit the 
                                                     
133 See Cosbey & Mavroidis, supra note 15 at 17.  
134 In a cap and trade system, efficiency considerations would dictate that all polluters pay 
the same price per ton of carbon emissions leaving carbon-intensive industries worse off. 
Political considerations, on the other hand, would lead to carving out some sort of 
exemptions for these industries for instance through provision of free carbon allowances. 
To balance efficiency with political (re-distributional) considerations, Hahn et al argue that 
“the government can set the overall emissions cap—whether on the basis of economic 
efficiency or, more likely, some other grounds—and then leave it up to the legislature to 
allocate the available number of allowances among sources (locations) to build a 
constituency of support for the initiative without reducing the system’s environmental 
performance or driving up its cost.” See Robert W. Hahn & Robert N. Stavins, The Effect of 
Allowance Allocations on Cap-and-Trade System Performance, 54(4) J. L. & ECON. S267-S294 
(2011). 
135 See Williamson’s “transaction cost” economic view on Stigler’s pure efficiency argument 
for “direct payment” in O Williamson, Economics and Organization: A Primer 32 CAL. MGMT 
REV. 143-44 (1996). 
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environment as discussed before (through making additional contributions if a 
right policy framework is in place), but also muster political support for a measure 
which would otherwise not be there.  
 
The politics of domestic preference is increasingly becoming an inherent part of any 
effective environmental policy. While the effectiveness of LCRs in spurring green 
innovation in the long run is still suggested to be in need of standing the test of 
time, Kuntze and Moerenhout, among others, point to the importance of viewing 
LCRs through a political lens – i.e. LCRs or other forms of local preference being 
a political necessity for the very existence of RE deployment policies.136 The case 
of Italian government is illustrative. It decided to slow down on PV instalments 
because the bulk of Italian tax money, due to EU-wide non-discrimination laws, 
was effectively boosting Spanish and German companies, rather than fostering 
nascent local industry.137 It is one thing to reject the long term vitality of the local 
industry and its worthiness of “protection”, as was the case for example in the 
failure story of Solyndra.138 It is yet another to examine whether the political capital 
behind an environmental measure would essentially falter if all the possibilities of 
an inclusion of the domestic industry is outlawed. Moreover, advocates of 
indiscriminate “subsidization” of environmental goods have to seriously rethink 
the fairness of situations in which developing countries, or financially squeezed 
nations such as Greece, would end up subsidizing first movers in the global RE 
industry.  
 
On the other hand, it is vital that climate and environmental policies are not stuck 
in a web of endless trade conflicts.139 But one should not overstate the case. In 
many occasions, practical compromises are reached as domestic politicians and 
bureaucrats become increasingly wary of frustrating global players “too much” by 
providing an unequal yet sizable share of the rent. In the case of China, for 
instance, the government avoided a trade conflict, at least in its early stages, with 
the EU by keeping the Spanish player (Gamesa) on the market for the purposes of 
training Chinese companies and transferring technology. 140  For vulnerable 
developing nations, the sheer pressure of realpolitik exerted on them by 
industrialized countries not to exclude them from the riches of environmental 
policy might well prove a sufficiently “balanced” approach to localization. Bigger 
                                                     
136 See Kuntze and Moerenhout, supra note 107 at 33, 44.  
137 Id. at 24.  
138 Rodrik, supra note 101. 
139 This line of argument is forcefully made in a joint article by an unusual pair of co-
authors coming from two institutions (Peterson Institute for International Economics and 
Pubic Citizen) at the opposite ends of the debate over trade agreements. See C. Fred 
Bergsten & Lori Wallach, Cooling the planet without chilling trade, WASHINGTON POST, Nov. 
13, 2009.  
140 Id. at 14.  
Summer, 2014]                                     Clash of Rationalities                                                208 
players such as US, China, EU, India or Brazil might also choose to avoid a 
standoff by entering into ad hoc agreements along the lines of the recently agreed 
solar deal between China and EU141 or the one proposed by the Solar Energy 
Industries Association (SEIA) offering an industry compromise between the US 
and Chinese solar industries.142 A group of countries might also decide to rule out 
the use of certain measures LCRs in their RE policies via a regional 143  or 
international agreement.144  
 
In this heavily political context, WTO adjudicators should be conscious of the role 
they play by widening or shutting the window of “rules” through interpretation 
(e.g. prohibition of LCRs) or defining what “exceptions” mean (GATT III.8 GP 
exceptions or GATT XX although never invoked). In this sense, WTO legal 
discourses on protectionism, subsidies, etc. remain inherently political (in the sense 
of “distributional”). WTO becomes a “continuation of politics” in the international 
economic relations however extended in the legal-formal sphere.145 
 
IV. CONCLUDING THOUGHTS: BEYOND THE WIN-WIN NARRATIVE 
The central concern within the dominant trade legal agenda seems to be how to 
rely on world trade law as a platform through which global players could claim a 
share in the rents (lucrative profits) created in a domestic clean energy policy. 
Exclusion of foreign players under such scenario amounts to trade protectionism 
and is dismissed out of hand. The win-win narrative of the trade-environment 
debate, relying on static micro economic efficiency coloured with the dispositions 
of public choice school, provides a suitable rationale providing support for 
distributing political stakes in favour of first movers in the global RE industry.  
 
Revisiting the issue of green industrial policy from the perspective of competing 
rationalities, things become much more complex. One would still consider 
(foreign) competition as a public good reducing the cost of environmental 
                                                     
141 Kanter & Bradsher, supra note 5. 
142  See SEIA Offers Industry Proposal to End U.S-China Solar Dispute (Sept. 23, 2013) 
http://www.seia.org/news/seia-offers-industry-proposal-end-us-china-solar-dispute.  
143 For ongoing discussions at APEC see Ministerial Statements, Surabaya, Indonesia, 20 - 
21 Apr 2013, Meeting of APEC Ministers Responsible for Trade, ¶ 13 available at 
http://www.apec.org/Meeting-Papers/Ministerial-Statements/Trade/2013_trade.aspx. 
(“We welcome the trade policy dialogue to discuss the economic impact of local content 
requirements in promoting economic growth and employment. We take note of the 
initiative to continue discussion among officials aimed at enhancing better understanding 
of the issues and formulating a way forward.”) 
144 The possibility for such an agreement is proposed in Kuntze and Moerenhout, supra 
note 107 at 40-1.  
145 See M KOSKENNEIEMI, supra note 79. 
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measures, and yet examine that along with the multiplicity of other considerations 
with a view to do what is best for the environment in the long run. Creating some 
form of a rent (through a subsidy, tariff or an LCR) coupled with a sunset clause, 
among many other details of architectural design which have to be adapted to the 
regulatory context, are considered as tools to achieve that goal.  
 
It is in the interest of the environment that the door should not be closed on 
democratic experimentation with different tools suitable for each context. The 
debate should not be dominated by narrow trade interests, which conveniently 
appropriates the win-win rationale as the only rational to dictate a one-size-fits-all 
policy. The trade law community needs to avoid being captured in the wrong 
binaries in their legal imagination and not place too much faith in the role of the 
WTO in “checking” protectionism, sweepingly defined as everything that is about 
localization or industrialization. Instead it should start appreciating the emergence 
of competing rationalities beyond the predominant win-win narrative.  
 
With respect to the case of Ontario FIT Programmes, the provincial government 
may have failed on all fronts. It may not only have failed in terms of designing a 
sensible policy of green industrialization (structure), but also in terms of balancing 
political interests to best galvanize support for FIT measures. But this does not 
exonerate the win-win narrative, which tells a very one-dimensional story of this 
multifaceted question. 
  
Current discourses of “trade protectionism” are ill equipped to address the 
contemporary problems of green industrial policy so far as we accept that some form 
of localization is regarded an essential part of any successful RE wide deployment 
policy. There is an accelerated rise of “autonomous societal fragments” 146  in 
transnational law each of which has its own mode of knowledge creation. In such a 
complex world of competing and conflicting rationalities, the WTO would be 
better placed if it maintained the door of GATT Article XX open in order to save 
some of these measures of industrial policy.  
                                                     
146 Teubner & Fischer-Lescano, supra note 23 at 1006.  
